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1. INTRODUCTION
When we speak of linkages, the topic of trade policy fre-
quently comes to mind. This is because trade policy is purpose-
fully (and often aggressively) being utilized, particularly by the
United States, and to a lesser extent the European Union ("EU"),
to influence the domestic policies of other states. This linkage be-
tween trade policy and foreign policy goals has become increas-
ingly common, in part owing to the growing importance of in-
ternational trade.
Trade policy linkages can be classified in terms of the subject
or area targeted. At least three types of trade policy linkages ex-
ist. They are (1) social policy linkages, (2) national security
(foreign) policy linkages, and (3) sectoral policy linkages. Each is
described below.
A "social policy linkage" exists when trade policy is used to
influence a social policy issue. Trade policy has been applied to
social issues such as human rights, the environment, labor stan-
dards, and public health concerns. When "trade and the envi-
ronment" are grouped together, this is a social policy linkage. So-
cial policy linkages can be applied unilaterally or multilaterally.
They are most controversial when unilateral in nature, as has
been the case in many of the well-known trade-related environ-
mental policy disputes. Social policy linkages can have implica-
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tions both for national security and for particular industrial sec-
tors.
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When trade policy is linked with national security policy ob-
jectives, this linkage can be termed a "national security" or
"foreign policy linkage." This type of linkage is the subject of an-
other conference paper, so it will not be discussed here, but it
should be noted that national security linkages have not escaped
criticism, particularly when partisan political objectives masquer-
ade as national security issues. This appears to be the case in cer-
tain recent trade disputes, such as that surrounding Helms-
Burton. National security linkages may not be effective if allies
do not cooperate. One need only consider the Dresser Industries
conflict of twenty years ago to appreciate this point. The eco-
nomic, as opposed to the symbolic (political) effect of national se-
curity linkages is dependent on supply and demand considera-
tions, in addition to the political will of one's allies and trading
partners. Without downgrading the importance of such linkages,
particularly when legitimate security goals, such as the prevention
of terrorism are at stake, one should be aware that those living
outside the U.S. have a greater tendency to view national security
linkages with skepticism.
The third category of linkages can be termed "sectoral policy
linkages." In the case of sectoral policy linkages, trade policy is
not linked with a particular social policy domain, but instead is
linked with a particular business sector. In such linkages, trade
policy negotiations are most frequently used as a means of open-
ing a specific business sector to greater international competition,
thereby bringing about its integration into the international trade
regime, or to use a popular word, its globalization. Sectoral pol-
icy linkages, like social policy linkages, exist unilaterally or multi-
laterally, though recent interest has focused on multilateral ap-
proaches. When we speak of telecommunications trade, we are
making a sectoral policy linkage. The February 15, 1997 WTO
Agreement on Telecommunications Services,2 which is designed
to liberalize the trade in basic telecommunications services, is a
1 Environmental damage can have national security implications. Labor
standards can affect competitiveness in various industrial sectors and therefore
have sectoral policy implications.
2 WTO Agreement on Telecommunications Services, Feb. 15, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 354. This Agreement is often referred to as the Fourth Protocol to the
General Agreement on Trade in Services.
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multilateral sectoral trade policy linkage. It will be discussed later
in this Article.
The recent history of international trade negotiations demon-
strates a strong preference for sectoral over social policy linkages.
Efforts to integrate environmental, labor, and human rights con-
cerns into the multilateral trade regime met with considerable re-
sistance from many contracting parties to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT'), and continue to meet with resis-
tance among the Members of the World Trade Organization
(WTO"). 4 In addition, the unilateral application of trade policy
measures to further environmental and other social policy objec-
tives has met with widespread criticism, particularly among de-
veloping nations in Asia and the Middle East.
This Article compares social policy linkages with sectoral pol-
icy linkages. It examines the preference for sectoral over social
policy linkages, contrasting the recent negotiating success of the
WTO Members in the telecommunications sector with the failure
of the WTO Members to make significant progress on pending
environmental and other social policy concerns. Furthermore,
this Article explores the basis for the dichotomy between social
and sectoral trade linkages and questions whether the recent
Agreement on Telecommunications Services ("Fourth Protocol")
may also have certain social policy implications. This Article
concludes by suggesting that the application of liberal trade rules
to service sectors, in particular telecommunications, may have
profound social policy implications, and that the distinction be-
tween social and sectoral policy trade linkages may eventually be-
come less significant.
2. TRADE LINKAGES
From the perspective of international relations there is little
new or extraordinary about the topic of linkages. It is a well-
studied concept. Political, economic, and military policies have
long been used as a means to influence the policies of other peo-
3 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 5 (1994) [hereinafter TE RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY RouND].
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ple, and more recently states. In particular the use of force, or the
threat of force, has long had a powerful influence on international
relations, and has often been linked with changes in the policies of
people and political entities. More recently, the application of
military pressure has given way to the utilization of economic
pressure as a means of achieving policy objectives. The use of le-
gal instruments to preserve the results achieved has also become
common and accepted.
From the legal perspective, the concept of linkages is also not
new. Over 100 years ago, Karl Marx (the son of a lawyer) linked
the application of law with the maintenance of the political and
economic status quo. Now, when we speak of trade policy link-
ages, we no longer speak just of the maintenance of the status quo,
but rather the advancement of economic, and more recently social
policy goals deemed desirable by the democratic governments that
are the locomotives leading trade policy reform.
Within the legal community, particularly among academics
and policy makers, there is a growing awareness and appreciation
of trade linkages. We see this awareness among our colleagues in-
volved in the environmental field and also among those involved
more specifically in trade policy matters. Much of this height-
ened interest is due to an increased understanding of science and
economics by the actors involved. This increased interest in trade
linkages may also be due to the growing tendency to enact bind-
ing international economic instruments that integrate, and
thereby linking, legal and economic concerns, such as the agree-
ments that have created international and regional trade arrange-
ments, including the WTO, EU, and the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").
From the environmental perspective, the interest in linkages is
readily understandable., Recent evidence strongly suggests that
environmental factors can be scientifically linked with health
problems, as well as such phenomena as global warming, ozone
depletion, and species extinction. From the perspective of inter-
national trade relations, the interest in linkages is also understand-
able, particularly if one is familiar with the economic aspects of
international trade theory, and the operation of the international
trade regime. In a nutshell, trade liberalization has been firmly
linked with international economic growth.5 This is not a new
5 See generally PAUL A. SAMUaLSON & WILuAM D. NORDHAUS,
ECONOMIcs (14th ed. 1992).
[Vol119:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/2
TELECOMMUNICA TIONS TRADE
concept. The idea of gains from trade goes back to Ricardo.
What is of interest is the fact that the rules of the GATT/WTO
regime have provided the framework and stability necessary both
for the growth in trade and for concomitant economic growth.
The rules of GATT/WTO have been credited by many for pro-
viding the foundation for a fifty year period of economic prosper-
ity and relative peace, almost unrivaled, in modern history. The
success of the international trade regime has also been credited
with facilitating the spread of the free-market system to many
corners of the world. Of course, there have also arguably been
negative social consequences.
3. SociAL POLIcY TRADE LINKAGES
To paraphrase a well-known comment, the rules of the inter-
national trade regime are not hostile to social concerns, just
"agnostic." 6 In general, these rules do not necessarily have direct
negative social consequences. In other words, it is difficult to es-
tablish a firm link between the rules of the international trade re-
gime and human rights abuses, environmental degradation, or the
insufficient protection of workers.7 Nor do these rules necessar-
ily have positive social implications. It is usually up to national
governments to establish their own social policies, distinct from
international trade policies. Of course domestic efforts to protect
the environment, human rights, and workers may have indirect
implications for international trade, and apparently neutral or ag-
nostic trade policy rules may also have implications for social pol-
icy concerns. Trade linkages can be either direct or indirect, and
the difference is always a matter of degree. To a large extent the
trade-related linkage debate concerns how far to travel down what
some regard as a very slippery slope.
Because of the economic and political success of the interna-
tional trade regime, which can be expected to grow due to this re-
gime's strengthened dispute settlement system, there has been a
concerted attempt to co-opt its rules for social policy purposes,
6 See Daniel C. Esty, GATTing the Greens: Not Just Greening the GA 77, 72
FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1993, at 32, 35 ("In truth, the GATT is not hostile
to the environment but agnostic.").
7 Admittedly, if the liberal trade regime leads to economic development,
certain forms of environmental degradation would increase. However, few
would argue that abject poverty should be preserved in certain countries in or-
der to protect the environment.
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i.e., to incorporate social policy norms into the international
trade regime, or to graft changes onto the international trade re-
gime so that trade rules can be more easily used to provide lever-
age for social policy reforms. Such a linkage would have the ef-
fect of expanding the reach of the trade regime into social policy
areas, most probably human rights, labor practices, and environ-
mental norms.
The history of the GATT Agreement demonstrates that social
policy linkages need not be a part of the international trade re-
gime for the regime to be economically successful. In fact, the
presence of social policy linkages may work to undermine the re-
gime if economic protectionism is the result. Nevertheless, social
policy linkages are actively promoted by people in many coun-
tries not only for underlying moral and philosophical grounds as-
sociated with the applicable social policy, but also for sensible po-
litical and even economic reasons.
Almost without exception there has been strong resistance in
Geneva to linking trade and certain social policies, in particular
environmental and labor concerns. Resistance to these social pol-
icy linkages appears, at times, almost institutional within portions
of the WTO Secretariat, among Geneva-based -trade negotiators,
and more broadly at the political level, particularly among devel-
oping country governments. GATT and WTO panel reports
have struck down trade measures purportedly designed to protect
or conserve herring,8 salmon,9 tuna, 0 oil resources,11 and clean
air.1 2 The debate is still ongoing with respect to sea turtles, and
animals caught in leg-hold traps, although many scholars doubt
that a significantly different result will be achieved with respect to
these issues. Trade negotiators in many countries have shown lit-
tle enthusiasm for expanding the protection in the WTO Agree-
8 See Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989).
' See id.
10 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, June 1994, 33 I.L.M. 839; GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Restric-
tions on Imports of Tuna, Aug. 16, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1594.
1 See GATT Dispute Panel Report on U.S. Taxes on Automobiles, Oct.
11, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1397.
12 See WTO Report of the Appellate Body on U.S. Standards for Reformu-
lated and Conventional Gasoline, May 20, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 603; WTO Dispute
Panel Report on U.S. Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
Jan. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 274.
[Vol119:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol19/iss2/2
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE
ment to social areas such as the environment. The suggestion
mooted by France and the U.S. to link labor rights and the WTO
Agreement has also not been warmly received. Lastly, even the
U.S. has retreated somewhat from linking human rights and
most-favored-nation ("MFN") treatment.
The moral and philosophical grounds for linking social policy
concerns and trade policy will be apparent to most readers.
However, the economic and political implications that lead some
to oppose social policy linkages may be less clear. Linking social
policies with trade policies inevitably favors those that have, using
the term in a slightly unusual sense, a "comparative advantage"
with respect to these policies, in particular, states that already
have higher degrees of protection for human rights, labor, and the
environment. Such linkages may prove economically disadvanta-
geous for states that lack the technology, resources, or political
will to implement a progressive social policy agenda. Those states
will be inclined to view, rightly or for rhetorical purposes, these
social policy linkages as a form of disguised protectionism. With-
out entering into this debate, it suffices to say that there are le-
gitimate concerns on both sides. For purposes of this Article, it is
the underlying linkages that are of interest.
At a superficial level of analysis, the link between trade policy
and certain social policy concerns may be viewed by some as
"artificial," an unnecessary add-on to the international trade re-
gime. As already noted, social policy concerns need not be re-
flected in trade policy for trade policy to be effective. In fact,
when the final product is examined, it is seldom discernible
whether goods are produced by child labor, by prison labor, 13 or
at great environmental cost. At a deeper level of analysis, how-
ever, there may be sound economic reasons for supporting certain
trade policy linkages. For example, if the failure to internalize
environmental externalities explains the prevalence of a particular
form of environmental degradation, linking trade policy and en-
vironmental standards may provide a means of promoting inter-
nalization, and thereby reducing environmental degradation. If
13 GATT Article XX(e) provides an exception from GATT discipline
"relating to the products of prison labour." This exception is arguably limited
by the terms of Article XX's chapeau. See Arthur E. Appleton, GA TlArticle
XX's Chapeau: A Disguised 'Necessary' Test?: The WITO Appellate Body's Ruling in
United States-Stanairds for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 6 REV.
EUR. COMMUN1TY& INT'LENVTL. L. 131 (1997).
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job opportunities in a highly competitive sweatshop "manned" by
children reduce the likelihood that these children will receive an
education, and further result in unemployment in the North,
many will see sound economic reasons for discriminating against
goods produced under such an arrangement.
Both examples relate to the "PPM problem." PPMs, or the
"processes and production methods" used to produce a particular
product, are often undetectable in the final product ("non-
product-related" or "NPR-PPMs"). For example, merely by ex-
amining a given pair of tennis shoes, it is usually impossible to
discern whether it is made by child labor, slave labor, or at great
environmental cost. Some assert that the general failure to differ-
entiate between products based on NPR-PPMs is arbitrary, while
others believe it is necessary for the preservation of the interna-
tional trade regime. Whichever side of the debate one is on, it
will probably be realized that the expression "NPR-PPMs" is a
misnomer. Labor, environmental, and human rights issues can
indeed be "related" to a product. When the phrase NPR-PPM is
used in the WTO-sense, the distinction being made is whether a
particular production-related activity is physically detectable in
the final product.
14
Any criticism of the PPM distinction implicitly constitutes an
attack on the definition of an Article I "like product" that has
been emerging in GATT/WTO panel reports.' The NPR-PPM
issue has become a divisive North-South issue that also divides de-
velopment advocates and environmentalists. Lurking behind this
issue are more difficult economic questions concerning compara-
tive advantage and internalization of externalities, as well as his-
torical arguments concerning the path to industrialization fol-
lowed by the North.
A question remains: is actively linking trade policy and social
policy concerns the most efficient way of implementing a social
4 There are trade policy linkages that are even more remote than that sug-
gested by the NPR-PPM debate, though the phrase "even more non-product
related" will never gain popularity. For example, a decision to raise tariffs on
products from a particular non-WTO Member across the board in retaliation
(or its human rigits abuses severs the link entirely between trade policy and the
social policies re ated to a particular product's manufacture.
15 But see Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labelling Practices on Im-
ported Wines and Alcoholic Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th
Supp.) at 116 (1988) (noting "manufacturing processes of products" as being
among the criteria to be examined in the determination of likeness).
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policy agenda? The answer would appear to be no. The theory
of optimum policy intervention suggests that the best solution to
many problems, in particular environmental problems, is to be
found as close to their source as possible.16 This often implies a
municipal law solution. However, from a practical perspective,
because many states lack the political will to make difficult eco-
nomic and social policy decisions, such linkages offer opportuni-
ties for advancing social policies. This point, the benefits that
may be attributable to unilateralism, is one that Steve Charnovitz
has made in several of his articles.1
7
Admittedly, there is no reason why rules governing human
rights, the environment, or labor practices could not be incorpo-
rated into the rules of the international trade regime. However,
there is not much support for such a linkage outside the devel-
oped world, and less than universal support for such a linkage
within the developed world. This is not to say that the future is
bleak for those who would want to see a more socially enlight-
ened international trade regime, rather this enlightenment will
probably not be achieved in the desired time-frame or manner. It
is difficult to believe that social criteria will never be grafted onto
what has proven to be a very flexible international trade regime,
either in a subsequent round of trade talks, or through separate
multilateral agreements. It is also difficult to believe that there
will be significant support for such changes from the developing
world until those countries achieve greater development.
4. SECTORAL POLICY TRADE LINKAGES
Social policy linkages, by their very nature, involve the appli-
cation of trade policy to achieve a desired social policy result. A
principal economic goal of trade policy, gains from trade through
market opening and trade liberalization, is not necessarily fur-
thered, and in some cases may even be placed at risk by social pol-
16 See GATT Secretariat, Multilateral Transparency of National Environ-
mental Regulations Likely to Have Trade Effects, Note by the Secretariat,
GATT Doc. No. TRE/W/4 (Nov. 16, 1992), at 6; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
Trade Policy, Environmental Policy and the GA T- Why Trade Rules and Envi-
ronmental Rules Should Be Mutually Consistent, 46 AUSSENWIRTScHAFT 197,
201-02 (1991).
17 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Environmentalism Confronts GA TT Rules: Re-
cent Developments and New Opportunities, J. WORLD TRADE, Apr. 1993, at 37,
45 n.48; Steve Charnovitz, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Green Trade- Defogging the
Debate, 27 CORNELL INT'L Lj. 459, 493-98 (1994).
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icy trade linakges."8 This is because, as explained above, social
policy linkages favor products and/or states that meet the appli-
cable social criteria. As a result, products from developed coun-
tries are favored.
When we speak of sectoral policy linkages, the situation is of-
ten much different. Economic policies applicable to specific busi-
ness sectors, as opposed to purely social policies, are likely to be
the central subject of debate.' 9 Unlike social policy linkages,
however, with sectoral policy linkages, trade policy is not neces-
sarily applied to produce a desired policy change. Instead, the
economic goals of trade policy are acknowledged, and through a
negotiation process in which economic incentives and limited po-
litical pressure are often applied, a commercial activity not fully
integrated into the international trade regime becomes more
closely linked with this regime's principles and rules. Incentives
and pressure may open the sector, but trade rules assure that the
sector remains open. Sectoral policy linkages are thus intertwined
with the goals of trade policy itself, in particular market opening
and trade liberalization. These linkages come not from the ag-
gressive application of trade policy, but from the acceptance of
trade rules and the application of these rules and disciplines to a
particular commercial sector. The process is by definition some-
what more consensual.
When the Annexes of the WTO Agreement are examined,
one finds that with the exception of the Agreement on the Appli-
cation of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (cSpS,,)20 and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights ("TRIPS"), many of these instruments can be linked with
sectoral as opposed to social policies. For example, sectoral multi-
lateral and plurilateral agreements were made concerning textiles,
agriculture, including dairy products and beef, services, civil air-
craft, and government procurement. Admittedly, the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade ("TBT")22 and the 1947 General
Other social policy trade linkages, in particular those for health reasons,
may actually help to further international trade.
19 The distinction may not always be clear. Certain economic polices may
be hard to differentiate from social policies.
20 See THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 69.
21 See i. at 365.
' See id. at 138.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT 1947")23 provide certain
social policy exceptions, but these exceptions are narrow and their
invocation will be rare. Even the SPS and TRIPS Agreements,
which involve important social policies, have predominately sec-
toral implications. 4 They serve to facilitate trade and protect the
integrity of the international trade regime. In contrast, the nego-
tiating history of the Decision on Trade and Environment, subse-
quent action with respect to this Decision in the WTO's Com-
mittee on Trade and Environment ("CTE"), as well as certain of
the aforementioned panel reports, demonstrate considerable
suspicion with respect to sectoral linkages, in particular environ-
mental linkages.
There may be many explanations for the preference for sec-
toral over social policy linkages, but in accord with Occam's ra-
zor, the simplest explanation may be the best. Trade policy is
generally identified with reaping the gains from trade-developing
a business climate, creating jobs, making money, and thereby in-
creasing national material well-being. By expanding international
trade, sectoral policy linkages, i.e., the application of trade liberal-
izing rules to new sectors, have the potential to create profits,
and, as a result, economic and political opportunities. It is there-
fore of interest to more of the government actors in international
trade negotiations, and more of the political and economic inter-
ests that stand behind these actors. Admittedly, this is a practi-
tioner's perspective. This view is neither meant to suggest that
social policy linkages are necessarily incompatible with the inter-
national trade regime, nor to downgrade the importance of such
linkages with respect to certain specific social policy issues, just to
note that they are, rightly or wrongly, viewed with suspicion in
certain quarters.
Sectoral policy linkages offer greater potential for compatibil-
ity with the principles of the international trade regime. Never-
theless, sectoral policy linkages, arguably shorthand for the con-
2' It should be noted that GATT 1947 is distinct from GATT 1994.
24 The SPS Agreement serves the social function of protecting plant and
animal life (including mankind) from disease and contamination, and the sec-
total function of facilitating trade in agricultural products. The TRIPS Agree-
ment serves the social function of strengthening the protection of creative
rights, and the sectoral function of establishing more predictable trade rules
when intellectual property rights are at issue, thereby affecting sectors such as
publishing, the recording indistry and the computer chip industry.
B See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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sensual application of WTO rules to sectors once beyond WTO
discipline, do have social implications. In recent years, the social
implications associated with market liberalization have become
increasingly apparent and have received considerable attention in
the trade policy debate. This is well illustrated by the social de-
bate concerning the liberalization of market access rules for beef
and rice in Japan and Korea. The debate concerning globalization
provides a second, and better known, example.
4.1. The Case of Telecommunications Trade: Links Within
Links
Having explored the dichotomy between social and sectoral
trade policy linkages, one important sectoral policy linkage will
be examined, and its social policy implications discussed. The
Agreement on Telecommunications Services, concluded in Febru-
ary 1997 among certain Members of the WTO, provides a good
example of a plurilateral sectoral policy linkage designed to facili-
tate trade and to satisfy international business expectations. It
also provides an excellent example of a sectoral policy trade
agreement with a multitude of cross-sectoral links and, perhaps
surprisingly, some unexpected social policy implications. Now is
an opportune moment to discuss this agreement given that its
protocol and annexes are scheduled to enter into force on Janu-
ary 1, 1998.26
The Agreement on Telecommunications Services is remark-
able, first for its scope, covering over ninety percent of world
telecommunications revenue; second for its depth-approximately
seventy governments from both the developed and the developing
world are signatories;27 and third for its breadth-as noted above,
cross-sectoral linkages abound. Not only are market access op-
portunities for the trade in telecommunications services covered,
within the service sector it also includes, to name a few, foreign
investment opportunities, competition provisions, and satellite
and cellular communications.
26 See Fourth Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services,
Apr. 30, 1996, 36 IL.M. 366.
27 See Ruggiero Congratulates Governments on Landmark Telecommunica-
tions Agreement (Feb. 17, 1997) (ast modified Feb. 27, 1997) <http://www.
to.or/_press/press67.htm> [hereinafter Ruggiero]; Statement, Ambassador
Barshefiky, Basic Telecom Negotiations (Feb. 15, 1997) (last modified Feb. 18,
1997) < http://www.ustr.govagreements/telecom/barshefsky.htm1>
[hereinafter Barshefsky].
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From an economic perspective, the significance of this agree-
ment should not be underestimated. Though figures vary, tele-
communications as a whole (the goods and services sector to-
gether) is now reported to be more than a $600 billion a year
industry and this figure may double or even triple in the next dec-
ade.28 This could mean global income gains of approximately one
trillion dollars in ten years, which translates to approximately
four percent of present world gross domestic product ("GDP").79
Yet, despite this growth, or maybe as a result of it, some predict
that international phone bills in the U.S. will fall eighty percent
during this period.3 If, as suggested, the preference for sectoral
policy linkages is in large part based on business interests, this is
one sector with profound business importance, and the ten years
it took to reach this agreement may have been worthwhile.
From a legal perspective, the Fourth Protocol is in line with
the development of the international trade system in the Uruguay
Round from a regime oriented towards trade in goods, to a re-
gime also applicable to trade in services. Yet, with respect to tele-
communications, this development is not as simple as it sounds.
The telecommunications service sector is not only a "distinct sec-
tor of economic activity [but] the underlying transport means for
other economic activities." 31  In addition, the Fourth Protocol
also establishes links between the telecommunications sector and
other "new" or emerging areas, including competition law and in-
vestment rules-the former being a business issue with social, as
well as economic policy implications. These "new" links will be
briefly discussed, not only because they are exciting, but also be-
cause they may have some predictive value. But before doing so,
a few technical words must be said about the Fourth Protocol so
that the linkages contained therein will be understood in their
proper context.
28 The public telecommunications sector is supposed to have generated
revenue of more than $600 billion in 1995. See Pekka Tarjanne, Telecommuni-
cations and Trade, Feb. 5, 1997 (visited Mar. 4, 1998) <littp://www.itu.int/ti
/papers/moscow97/moscow97.htm>; Barshefsky, supra note 27.
39 See Ruggiero, supra note 27.
3o See Barshefsky, supra note 27.
1 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex on Telecommumca-
tions, para. 1, reprinted in TH-E RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note
4, at 359 [hereinafter Annex on Telecommunications].
19981
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
In the General Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS"),2 a
distinction well known to U.S. telecommunications attorneys was
made between "basic"33 and "value added"34 telecommunications
services. 35 Specific commitments were made with respect to value
added services, but an agreement was not reached on basic serv-
ices. The result was that while business use of basic telecommuni-
cations services was generally guaranteed,36 participation in the ac-
tual provision of these basic services, for example, voice telephony
(including mobile phones), telex, fax, leased lines, and packet and
circuit switched data, whether by satellite, wire, cable, or radio,
was not guaranteed.
The Fourth Protocol brought these telecommunications serv-
ices into the GATS framework, thus ensuring MFN treatment,
transparency, and a variant of national treatment suitable to this
service sector. Like other service sector negotiations, market ac-
cess commitments were based on modes of supply.37 These com-
32 See id. at 327.
33 Basic telecommunications can be thought of as "telecommunications
transport networks and services." Decision on Negotiations on Basic Tele-
communications, para. 1, reprinted in id. at 461. Paragraph 1 of a note that was
not intended to be legally binding also provides what may be viewed as a defini-
tion, or example, of basic telecommunications services. See WTO Doc.
S/GBT/W/2/Rev.1 (Jan. 16, 1997) 36 I.L.M. 371.
" Value-added telecommunications services can be thought of as services
that add value to a customer's information by "enhancing its form or content
or by providing for its storage and retrieval." Ruggiero, supra note 27. They
include e-mail, voice mail, on-line data processing, on-line data retrieval, and
electronic data interchange. In conjunction with the Uruguay Round, 44
schedules (representing 55 governments) were submitted and are now in force.
See id.
35 See generally Marco C.E.J. Bronckers & Pierre Larouche, Telecommuni-
cations Services and the World Trade Organization, J. WORLD TRADE, June
1997, at 5, 16-18. The authors provide a sample schedule differentiating be-
tween basic and value added telecommunications services. See id at 48.
36 See Annex on Telecommunications, supra note 31, at 359.
37 The modes of supply of services are set forth in Article 1(2) of the GATS
Agreement. They are:
(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member [cross-border supply]; (b) in the territory of one Member to
the service consumer of any other Member [consumption abroad];
(c) by a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence
mi the territory of any other Member [commercial presence]; (d) by a
service supplier of one Member, through presence of natural persons of
a Member in the territory of any other Member [presence of natural
persons].
Id. art. I, para. 2, at 328.
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mitments are important for the provision of services, including
telecommunications services. In addition to market access com-
mitments, the agreement contains regulatory commitments that
are presented in a short but important Reference Paper ("RP").38
Some of the linkages contained in the RP are mentioned below.
The RP embodies the spirit of the Fourth Protocol. Applica-
ble only to basic telecommunications services, it is designed to
protect new entrants into the telecommunications market from
the commercial power and influence of "major suppliers,"39 in-
cluding monopoly providers and former monopoly providers that
remain the primary basic telecommunications service providers in
many nations. 4° In other words, the RP links competition law
with the provision of telecommunications services, perhaps a ne-
cessity given the historical dominance of monopoly providers in
the telecommunications industry. Members are required to pre-
vent major telecommunications service suppliers from engaging in
or continuing anti-competitive practices, which are defined in
paragraph 1.2 to include cross-subsidization, the anti-competitive
use of information obtained from competitors, and the failure to
make necessary technical and commercial information available to
other service suppliers on a timely basis. In addition, the agree-
ment seeks to ensure timely access (interconnection with major
service suppliers), transparency, the prevention of discrimination
against other basic service suppliers, and impartial dispute resolu-
tion.
The link between the provision of services and competition
law is significant. For some time there has been talk about incor-
porating competition law into the GATT/WTO framework.
Now this talk is becoming a reality. Admittedly, the historical
power of monopoly service providers in this industry may have
made this linkage inevitable, but it is not improbable that a simi-
lar linkage may begin to crop up in other sectors, just as competi-
tion law first became a part of certain national legal systems and is
now being developed at the regional level.
41
38 See Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997).
3 A major supplier is defined in the RP as "a supplier which has the ability
to materially affect the terms of participation (having regard to price and sup-
ply) in the relevant market for basic telecommunications services as a result of:
a) control over essential facilities; or (b) use of its position in the market." Id.
See generally Bronckers & Larouche, supra note 35, at 23.
41 See, e.g., TREATY ESTABLISH[NG THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMM-
UNITY, opened for signature Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
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A second interesting link made in the Fourth Protocol is that
concerning investment decisions applicable to the basic telecom-
munications service sector. By bringing basic telecommunications
services into the GATS framework, parties to the Fourth Proto-
col (unless otherwise specified in their schedules), have agreed not
to maintain or adopt limitations on the participation of foreign
capital in their telecommunications sectors.42 This liberalization
of investment, in what has traditionally been a sector not particu-
larly open to foreign investment, is in accord with the general
philosophy underlying the TRIMS Agreement (which is only ap-
plicable to trade in goods),43 as well as general efforts underway to
liberalize trade in financial services.
Is it significant that an agreement liberalizing trade in the tele-
communications sector also links together competition considera-
tions and investment practices? The answer is probably yes. As
noted above, there would appear to be predictive value in analyz-
ing the linkages present in trade agreements. This is one reason
why the concept of linkages is of academic importance. The link-
ages present in the Fourth Protocol may provide clues to the evo-
lution of the international trade regime. If this is correct, we can
expect to see the inclusion of competition and investment provi-
sions in future trade agreements.
It is conceivable that the successful liberalization of the trade
in goods made the liberalization of the trade in services not only
possible, but desirable and inevitable, 44 and that the successful lib-
eralization of the trade in services, in particular trade in commu-
nications services, will lead to further linkages between trade and
certain social policy sectors. In the last fifty years, we have seen
the systematic growth in the rules, scope, and objectives of the in-
ternational trade regime, as well as the systematic expansion of
global international trade. This is no accident. The economic
success of the GATT/WTO regime has raised the expectations of
trade negotiators and the business community alike. It has also
led to an understanding that trade in goods and services are
linked, and that subjects such as competition law, the protection
of intellectual property, and rules governing investment measures
42 See Annex on Telecommunications, art. XVI(2)(f), supra note 31, at 359.
43 See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, reprinted in THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 4, at 163.
For example, once trade in goods was liberalized, there was considerable
pressure to open the service sector applicable to the transport of these goods.
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are also linked to the continued liberalization of trade in goods
and services. Might social linkages also have implications for the
development of the international trade regime? This is the subject
of the concluding Section of this Article.
4.2. Telecommunications Trade: Blurring Social and Sectoral
Linkages
Few would take issue with the argument that the liberaliza-
tion of the trade in goods has led to greater opportunities for eco-
nomic development. Some would even go a step further and say
that economic development has resulted in greater political stabil-
ity, higher levels of education, and made the expansion of democ-
racy possible in countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea,
and more recently in Eastern Europe and South America. Can a
similar path be charted for trade in services, and more particularly
telecommunications services? The liberalization of trade in tele-
communications services can be expected to provide economic
developmental opportunities, but it also seems likely that it will
have social ramifications. To what extent will the liberalization
of the telecommunications service sector eventually be linked to
social changes? It is suggested here that the Fourth Protocol
(applicable to telecommunications services), coupled with the on-
going liberalization in the trade in telecommunications goods that
occurred as a result of the GATS negotiations, will indeed have
important social implications.
It is estimated that more than one-half of the world's popula-
tion have never made a phone call.45 With the liberalization of
the telecommunications sector, and anticipated cost reductions
and savings in this sector of perhaps $200 billion expected by the
year 2010,46 prospects are excellent that there will be a steady rise
in telephone use throughout the world. International calls are al-
ready increasing in countries that permit competition in the pro-
vision of international telecommunications services.47 With in-
creased international communication, there will be increased
knowledge about social conditions in other countries. In particu-
lar, information concerning human rights standards and abuses
45 See Barshefsky, supra note 27, at 3.
See Philippe Wintrebert, WTO Negotiations - Success in the World of
Telecom Regulations (IBM Global Services) (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://
www.ibm.coin/Services/articles/geneva.html >.
47 See Tarjanne, supra note 28, at 4-5.
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will travel more speedily around the globe. Couple this with the
possibility that value added telecommunications services, such as
those associated with the Internet, may also further the transmit-
tal of social norms, and it is just possible that the liberalization of
the telecommunications sector will have a profound social influ-
ence among states open to such change. In other words, just as an
increase in the trade in goods resulted in an increase in national
wealth, an increase in the availability of affordable telecommuni-
cations services should result in improved social conditions: Af-
fordable telecommunications may work to lessen political repres-
sion throughout the world by mobilizing "voices" in open
countries, and by casting more light from the outside world on
closed countries.
Similar arguments can be made for labor and environmental
concerns. Increased access to basic telecommunications services,
coupled with more affordable value-added services, should mean
increased knowledge about international labor practices and envi-
ronmental norms. Provided that telecommunications rates fall
sufficiently and that government and business leaders adopt an en-
lightened view, the potential exists for telephone access, even by
those in remote and poor regions. With this access should come a
new vision of how life might one day be. Futhermore, the ongo-
ing integration of various media into the Internet can only expand
this vision.
Improved telecommunications services also offer the potential
for easier access to political leaders. No longer are diplomats and
other government officials capable of isolating themselves from
their constituencies. As anyone involved in politics knows, po-
litical representatives are now only a phone call away from those
who wish to contact them. Mobile telephone numbers are now as
jealously guarded as home phone numbers. The potential to
reach out and touch political leaders and government officials has
seldom been greater. With the progressive liberalization of the
telecommunications sector, this potential can be expected to grow
and to be felt increasingly in cities like Geneva where important
trade policy agreements are negotiated.
In conclusion, while WTO Members may be reticent to in-
corporate social policy measures into the WTO Agreement, or to
sanction the application of certain controversial social policy
measures, such as trade-related environmental measures, time is
on the side of those who advocate an enlightened international
trade regime. This does not mean that these advocates should re-
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lax, just that they should be aware that the sectoral expansion of
the international trade regime may eventually work more in their
favor.
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